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Abstract 
This paper examines the motives, timing and informal constraints of state confiscation in the Ottoman 
Empire, focusing on one of its most turbulent and confiscatory periods, 1750-1839. Utilizing a new 
dataset uncovered from confiscation inventories, I first demonstrate that confiscations were practiced 
on a selective basis, targeting some office-holders and tax farmers. Second, employing a two-step 
econometric framework inspired by the gradual nature of Ottoman confiscations, I argue that the initial 
decision whether to send an agent to confiscate one’s wealth was driven mainly by severity of war and 
expected costs of confiscation, while attributes of wealth and bargaining power of families vis-à-vis the 
central administration shaped the outcome of the second step. 
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1 Introduction	In	1786,	Sultan	Abdülhamid	I	(1774-1789)	asked	the	opinion	of	the	Grand	Vizier	whether	it	was	appropriate	to	confiscate	the	wealth	of	a	major	tax	farmer	in	central	Anatolia.	The	response	of	the	vizier	was	negative	because	the	center	could	need	the	tax	farmer’s	family	in	future.	The	vizier	reasoned	his	opinion	as	such:	(1)	the	family	was	constantly	manning	the	imperial	army,	and	(2)	its	local	know-how	was	immense	that	it	could	not	be	replaced	easily	by	a	centrally	appointed	official	(Uzunçarşılı	1974).	To	put	it	differently,	the	family’s	bargaining	power	vis-à-vis	the	center	functioned	as	a	mechanism	of	protection.	Archival	records	explicitly	demonstrate	that	confiscation	attempts	did	not	necessarily	end	with	full	confiscation	of	assets	that	other	scenarios	were	possible.	Some	were	more	capable	of	pro-tecting	their	wealth	against	the	threat	of	confiscation.	This	paper	studies	what	exactly	led	to	these	varying	levels	of	protection.		
The	practice	of	confiscation	is	one	of	the	least	studied	topics	of	Ottoman	history.	One	rea-son	for	the	lack	of	a	systematic	analysis	could	be	the	nature	of	sources,	which	are	quite	dispersed,	and	therefore	require	a	tremendous	work	to	locate.	The	well-established	view	that	it	was	a	non-codified	convention	applying	to	whoever	made	wealth	by	imperial	grant	is	arguably	another	reason	by	making	historians	think	of	it	as	unworthy	of	examination.	The	most	dubious	assumption	of	this	view	is	that	it	treats	the	practice	of	confiscation	as	a	unit,	overlooking	its	temporal,	spatial,	political	and	economic	contextuality.	(Abou-El-Haj	2005:	48).	Moreover,	some	economic	historians	have	presented	it	as	one	of	the	culprits	of	economic	underdevelopment	(Kuran	2010)	(Çizakça	2010).	What	these	works	inherently	assume	is	that	productive	classes	were	greatly	suffering	from	the	threat	of	confiscation.	The	themes	and	method	of	this	paper	are	new	to	the	historiography,	while	it	contributes	to	the	above	debate	only	indirectly	by	showing	who	were	the	most	affected	and	why.		
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The	paper	has	a	relevance	beyond	Ottoman	history.	Confiscation	by	the	ruler	was	histor-ically	a	common	phenomenon	not	only	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	but	in	many	parts	of	the	world.	Dating	back	at	least	to	Adam	Smith,	it	has	long	been	argued	to	be	detrimental	to	prosperity	primarily	due	to	its	adverse	effects	on	incentives.1	More	recently,	it	was	new	institutional	economics	(NIE)	that	brought	the	question	of	state	predation	back	into	the	center	of	growth	literature	(North	and	Weingast	1989)	(Acemoglu	and	Robinson	2012).	The	proponents	of	NIE	have	acknowledged	that	a	state	powerful	enough	to	protect	prop-erty	rights	and	enforce	contracts	can	use	its	power	to	confiscate	the	wealth	of	its	subjects	(Weingast	1995).	Focusing	on	type	of	political	institutions	that	constrain	political	execu-tives,	many	studies	find	a	positive	relationship	between	precocious	development	of	such	institutions	and	economic	growth	(see,	for	example:	(DeLong	and	Shleifer	1994))	
It	must	be	recognized	that	historical	growth	literature	is	recently	shifting	away	from	the	predatory	state	paradigm.	An	increasing	number	of	works	concentrate	on	the	capacity	of	states	not	only	to	maintain	law	and	order	but	to	tax	their	subjects.	It	is	argued	that	political	and	jurisdictional	fragmentation,	not	predation,	was	the	main	problem	of	stagnant	econ-omies	of	pre-modern	period	(Epstein	2000)	(Grafe	2012).	Although	it	has	been	acknowl-edged	that	property	rights	protection	should	be	considered	as	a	private,	not	public	good,	in	pre-modern	context	(Epstein	2000:	14-15),	the	following	questions	are	yet	to	attract	sufficient	interest.	If	there	was	not	such	a	thing	as	unconstrained	sovereign,	what	informal	constraints	and	strategic	calculation	prevented	rulers	from	confiscating	more	than	they	did?	Similarly,	on	what	basis	did	they	allocate	the	public	good	of	protection?	How	did	‘ab-solutist’	states	confiscate	in	times	of	crisis?	Answering	these	questions	can	contribute	to	a	more	balanced	understanding	of	historical	state	predation	and	limits	of	state	power,	and	potentially	explain	why	state	predation	was	not	the	important	culprit	for	underdevelop-ment.		
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It	is	not	that	the	whole	literature	ignored	these	issues,	but	that	many	did	not	choose	to	make	them	engines	of	their	arguments.	Like	what	happened	in	the	opening	anecdote,	Ve-itch	(1986)	conditions	the	happening	of	confiscation	to	the	availability	of	an	alternative	group	to	serve	the	same	function	as	 the	confiscated	group.	According	to	Olson	(2000),	expectance	of	short	tenures	is	responsible	for	the	sovereign’s	becoming	confiscatory.	In	an	anarchic	world,	he	writes,	roving	bandits	would	confiscate	everything	that	is	produced,	which	is	why	people	prefer	stationary	bandits	who	would	confiscate	consistent	with	rev-enue	maximization.	Hirschman	(1970)	inspired	many	subsequent	scholars	with	his	the-ory	of	the	relationship	between	power	and	predation.	He	suggests	that	asset	mobility	de-termines	one’s	ability	to	escape	from	state	predation.	In	a	similar	vein,	Vahabi	(2016)	pre-sents	the	role	of	appropriability	of	assets	as	the	most	important	factor	limiting	govern-ment	 confiscation.	Bargaining	power	of	wealth-holders	vis-à-vis	 the	 ruler	was	empha-sized	by	Levi	(1988)	and	Greif	(2008).	Given	the	lack	of	centralization	in	most	of	early	modern	world,	 rulers	heavily	depended	on	other	actors	possessing	military,	 economic	and	political	resources	(Glete	2002).	The	degree	of	this	reliance	was	a	determinant	of	their	policies	 including	confiscating	 the	wealth	of	 their	agents.	This	paper	 interrogates	such	claims	by	employing	the	Ottoman	case	as	a	testing	ground.		
The	rest	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	provides	a	historical	background	of	the	Ottoman	practice	of	confiscation	as	well	as	the	period	under	question.	Section	3	offers	important	theoretical	considerations	regarding	the	ruler’s	incentive	structure.	Sec-tion	4	introduces	the	data	while	presenting	some	descriptive	statistics	to	help	understand	the	nature	of	Ottoman	confiscations.	Section	5	presents	the	empirical	strategy,	whereas	section	6	discusses	results	and	their	broader	implications.	Section	7	concludes.		
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2 Historical	Context		Confiscation	by	the	ruler	was	known	as	müsadere	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.	This	convention	as	well	as	its	name	have	been	adopted	from	earlier	Muslim	states,	where	it	had	been	used	essentially	as	a	punitive	measure	to	prevent	corrupt	behavior	of	administrative	agents	such	as	bribery,	embezzlement	and	overexploitation	of	tax	payers.	Over	time,	it	evolved	into	a	practice	targeting	those	who	made	wealth	by	imperial	grant	irrespective	of	com-mitment	of	a	crime	and	was	used	as	a	tool	of	revenge	and	threat	(Tomar	2007).	Many	medieval	and	early	modern	Muslim	states	resorted	to	confiscations	though	with	varying	motives	 (Islam	1985).	 Islamic	 law	 allows	 the	 ruler’s	 discretionary	 confiscation	 only	 if	practiced	as	a	method	of	punishment.2	Although	it	has	never	been	mentioned	in	Ottoman	codifications	of	law,	confiscation	remained	an	influential	convention	of	and	a	useful	tool	in	the	hands	of	the	sultans	circa	from	1453	to	1839.	
This	long	period	cannot	be	treated	as	a	single	unit.	It	is	essential	to	distinguish	two	periods	of	müsadere,	namely	those	before	the	eighteenth	century	and	those	during	the	long-eight-eenth	century.	During	the	first	period	confiscations	were	mostly	directed	at	officials	after	their	death.	In	the	eighteenth	century	and	especially	during	its	second	half,	it	was	arguably	employed	more	arbitrarily,	that	is,	began	to	target	traditionally	untargeted	groups	such	as	local	elites	engaged	in	tax	farming.	A	second	distinction	is	that	earlier	examples	com-prised	of	efforts	to	distinguish	between	one’s	personal	wealth	(usually	left	to	family)	and	the	wealth	gained	by	office-holding	(usually	confiscated),	such	efforts	simply	disappeared	later	partly	due	to	its	impracticality	(Barkan	1980).	Furthermore,	the	process	of	confisca-tion	became	more	sophisticated	in	this	century	considering	new	methods	of	enforcement	and	agents	introduced	to	the	system.		
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These	differences	partly	stemmed	from	the	political	atmosphere	of	the	eighteenth	cen-tury.	At	that	time	the	Empire	was	relatively	decentralized	marked	by	the	rise	of	local	elites	to	power.	Deriving	their	sources	of	revenue	from	the	practice	of	life-term	tax	farming	in-troduced	in	1695,	these	new	actors	gradually	took	control	of	a	significant	part	of	provin-cial	resources.	Enrichment,	however,	did	not	come	without	risks.	From	the	second	half	of	the	century,	they	turned	into	new	targets	of	confiscation.	Yet	archival	records	explicitly	show	that	they	did	not	face	insecurity	of	property	equally	despite	the	official	claim	that	sometimes	pops	up	in	sources	was	that	whoever	made	wealth	by	office-holding	shall	be	confiscated	upon	death	or	punishment	(Yaycıoğlu	2016).	One	of	the	aims	of	this	paper	is	to	understand	the	dynamics	of	these	varying	levels	of	protection.		
A	 final	dimension	of	historical	context	concerns	 the	period	covered	by	 the	data,	1750-1839.	This	period	was	characterized	by	a	fiscal	and	political	crisis	that	threatened	the	very	existence	of	the	Empire.	Fiscal	innovations	were	not	sufficient	to	increase	tax	revenues	of	the	central	administration	necessary	for	financing	wars	abroad	and	containing	domestic	revolts.	The	Russo-Ottoman	war	of	1768-1774	turned	a	new	page	in	the	history	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	due	to	its	military	and	fiscal	weaknesses	becoming	apparent	(Neumann	2006).	To	remedy	these	problems,	the	sultans	have	undertaken	a	series	of	reforms	such	as	establishing	a	Western-style	army	and	treasury.	However,	given	the	current	 institu-tional	setting,	waging	wars	and	implementing	reforms	could	not	be	achieved	without	the	support	of	provincial	elites.	Some	put	explicit	support,	while	some	were	not	willing	and	even	occasionally	rebelled	against	the	center	when	their	interests	were	harmed.	This	was	both	the	cause	and	outcome	of	a	centralization	project	launched	by	Mahmud	II	(r.	1808-1839).	He	partially	managed	to	curb	the	power	of	 local	elites	by	 the	1820s	 (Shaw	and	Shaw	1977:	14-16).			
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Does	the	fact	that	the	chosen	period	was	exceptional	 in	some	ways	pose	a	problem?	It	does	not	because	this	paper	does	not	generalize	its	findings	to	earlier	periods	of	Ottoman	history.	They	reflect,	before	anything	else,	the	characteristics	of	confiscations	during	this	period.	The	advantage	of	focusing	on	this	turbulent	period,	on	the	other	hand,	is	that	it	allows	to	quantitatively	measure	the	impact	of	wars	and	rebellions	on	the	confiscation	activity.	That	the	first	twenty	years	of	the	period	was	relatively	more	peaceful	is	benefited	for	comparison.		
3 Theoretical	Considerations	What	are	the	main	drivers	of	state	confiscation	and	what	can	limit	it?	This	section	offers	a	theoretical	perspective	to	this	question.	The	context-specific	model	proposed	here	relies	on	an	extended	version	of	rational	behavior,	which	considers	not	only	economic	but	po-litical	incentives.	It	focuses	solely	on	quantifiable	behavior,	however.	That	is,	two	types	of	observed	behavior	are	excluded:	agent	cheating	and	military	resistance	of	families.		
Under	these	assumptions,	the	sultan	has	two	types	of	payoff,	namely	monetary	and	polit-ical.	Like	every	rational	individual,	he	tries	to	optimize	his	gains	and	not	to	incur	losses.	To	do	so,	he	needs	to	calculate	how	profitable	each	case	of	confiscation	is	both	in	mone-tary	and	political	terms.	This	approach	is	consistent	with	historical	reality.	Confiscation	records	sometimes	contain	a	section	of	monetary	calculation.	However,	it	was	not	uncom-mon	that	wealth	with	unworthy	or	even	negative	net	values	was	also	confiscated,	which	makes	it	necessary	to	include	the	calculation	of	political	payoff	though	in	a	more	hypo-thetical	sense.		
For	simplicity,	first	consider	the	case	where	political	payoff	is	zero,	meaning	that	political	costs	and	benefits	are	equal.	If	this	is	the	case,	the	decision	to	confiscate	would	be	gov-erned	entirely	by	monetary	calculation.	Monetary	payoff	here	concerns	the	profitability	
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of	confiscation	as	the	monetary	value	is	the	transferable	amount	or	net	value	of	wealth,	which	equal	the	total	value	of	wealth	and	receivables	minus	debts	and	direct	costs	of	con-fiscation	 (Vahabi	 2016:	 154).	 Direct	 costs	 are	 the	 costs	 of	 transportation	 and	 agency.	Agency	costs	are	the	commissions	paid	to	confiscators	and	other	less	important	agents	taking	part	in	the	enforcement.	Even	though	the	value	of	these	commissions	was	also	de-termined	by	the	duration	of	the	process,	which	is	a	function	of	the	complexity,	costs	of	agency	and	transportation	were	largely	governed	by	various	aspects	of	asset	confiscabil-ity.		
The	components	of	asset	confiscability	are,	to	a	large	extent,	associated	with	spatial	con-straints.	This	stems	from	the	intuition	that	the	capacity	and	willingness	to	confiscate	of	the	sovereign	should	be	unevenly	distributed.3	I	mainly	consider	here	the	distance	from	the	physical	location	of	the	wealth	to	where	it	is	transported	(Istanbul	with	few	excep-tions)	and	to	the	sea,	although	there	are	other	spatial	constraints	such	as	the	conditions	of	the	road	to	the	destination	and	the	administrative	status	of	the	location.	The	proximity	from	the	destination	matters	as	it	affects	direct	agency	and	transportation	costs.	There	was	indeed	a	positive	relationship	between	the	distance	and	the	confiscator’s	commis-sion.	As	for	transportation	costs,	most	assets	were	sent	to	the	capital	in	kind,	or	else	as	cash	acquired	from	auctions	in	which	they	were	sold.	In	fact,	the	spatial	aspects	of	asset	confiscability	could	have	been	influenced	by	organizational,	administrative	and	transport	technology	as	well.	However,	the	impact	of	technological	change	is	rather	negligible	since,	to	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	there	was	not	any	significant	technological	progress	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	during	the	period	of	concern.	The	non-spatial	elements	of	asset	confisca-bility	are	the	concentration,	specificity	and	measurability	of	assets.	The	more	liquid	assets	are,	for	example,	the	more	confiscable	they	are.		
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Political	payoff,	however,	was	hardly	zero,	especially	when	it	comes	to	the	confiscation	of	those	who	were	closely	linked	with	the	central	government	politically	and	economically.	Although,	 in	 theory,	 sultans	had	an	unquestionable	authority,	 there	existed	 forces	 that	balanced	their	power.	In	the	eighteenth	century,	these	forces	derived	mainly	from	the	in-creasing	influence	of	local	elites.	It	is	true	that	their	capacity	to	impact	government	poli-cies,	after	all,	proved	insufficient	to	produce	formal	institutions	that	could	effectively	and	sustainably	 constraint	 the	 sovereign	power	 (Pamuk	2012).	Nevertheless,	 sultans	were	hardly	free	from	the	risk	of	dethronement	even	though	they	were	invariably	replaced	by	other	members	of	the	same	dynasty	once	dethroned.	In	addition	to	this	risk,	under	intense	external	threat,	the	ruler	could	turn	to	confiscation	as	an	extraordinary	source	of	revenue	regardless	of	whether	it	would	have	paid	off	monetarily.		
Another	constraint	of	the	ruler	is	facing	a	trade-off	regarding	whose	wealth	to	confiscate.	In	that,	they	consider	the	bargaining	position	of	the	potential	victims.	That	is,	in	the	Otto-man	case,	targeting	an	individual	or	family	with	high	bargaining	power	was	costlier	for	three	 reasons.	 First,	 some	who	were	 organized	 as	 patrimonial	 families	 had	 their	 own	troops	in	which	they	had	been	investing	for	decades.	They	could	and	did	sometimes	use	their	 military	 power	 against	 the	 central	 government.	 Certainly,	 the	 center’s	 military	strength	was	superior	to	theirs.	But	the	fact	that	they	possessed	armed	troops	had	the	effect	of	deterrence,	especially	when	the	opportunity	cost	of	fighting	a	local	trouble-maker	was	high.	More	importantly,	many	potential	targets	of	confiscation	had	a	symbiotic	rela-tionship	with	the	imperial	center,	which	required	them	to	provision	wars	abroad	by	man-ning	imperial	armies	or	sending	food	and	munition	to	warzones	(Yaycıoğlu	2016).	Credi-bility	of	these	threats	depended	also	on	the	nature	of	fiscal	markets	they	operated.	As	for	provincial	elites,	some	enjoyed	monopolies,	while	some	had	to	compete	with	others.	A	
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family	particularly	successful	in	rent-seeking,	that	is,	capturing	monopoly	rents	of	its	area	of	influence,	was	unlikely	to	be	replaced	when	its	wealth	and	power	was	fully	confiscated.				
4 Data	and	General	Patterns	This	study	 is	based	on	 information	collected	 from	confiscation	 inventories	 (muhallefat	
defterleri)	preserved	in	the	Prime	Ministry	Ottoman	Archives	in	Istanbul.	These	invento-ries	were	mostly	prepared	by	an	agent	(mübaşir:	literally	bailiff),	that	I	prefer	to	call	con-fiscator,	sent	to	the	location	of	wealth.	These	documents	typically	contain	three	parts.	The	introductory	protocol	consists	of	a	summary	of	the	case	including	the	name,	occupation	and	location	of	the	individual	and	the	names	of	third	parties	involved	in	the	enforcement	process.	The	second	part	provides	a	 list	of	assets	owned	by	the	confiscated	 individual.	Ranging	from	a	single	page	to	tens	of	pages,	these	lists	come	either	with	or	without	prop-erty	categories.	The	third	section,	which	lacks	from	some	inventories,	contains	a	brief	cal-culation	of	net	value.		
My	sample	includes	1,017	cases	of	confiscation.	It	must	be	stated	at	the	outset	that	inevi-table	barriers	make	a	‘perfectly’	random	sampling	difficult.	It	is	nearly	impossible	to	know	the	entire	population	(N)	and	its	characteristics	primarily	because	we	do	not	know	if	an	inventory	was	prepared	or	survived	for	all	confiscations.	Thus,	we	cannot	estimate	the	crucial	ratio	of	n/N	where	n=1,017.	Equally	important,	I	had	to	rule	some	confiscations	out	due	to	important	missing	variables,	especially	the	dependent	variable.	One	positive	point	about	the	representativeness	of	the	data	is	that	the	catalogue,	where	most	invento-ries	used	in	the	data	come	from	(See:	Appendix	B),	show	a	reasonable	degree	of	diversity	in	terms	of	 location,	social	groups,	and	period,	and	met	my	expectations	on	where	and	when	confiscations	were	known	to	be	the	most	prevalent.	For	example,	as	expected,	the	share	in	Istanbul	is	relatively	higher	than	other	locations.		
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What	 information	was	gathered	 in	confiscation	 inventories?	The	 introductory	protocol	provided	the	identity	and	location	of	wealth-holders.	Titles	present	in	official	sources	are	quite	telling,	especially	when	it	comes	to	the	elites	that	constitute	the	focus	of	this	paper.	From	one’s	title,	the	historical	can	tell	his	or	her	gender,	religion,	secular	title,	social	group	as	defined	in	Ottoman	political	thinking,	family	affiliation	and	whether	he	completed	pil-grimage.4	A	wealth-holder’s	profession	was	mostly	affixed	to	the	title	as	well.	For	women,	however,	profession	was	invariably	missing.	The	protocol	occasionally	gives	the	justifica-tion	for	confiscations	(390	cases).	The	date	included	in	the	data	set	is	the	end	date	of	the	process	of	confiscation	evident	in	the	date	of	final	inventory.	In	addition	to	the	identity	of		
Table	1.		
Targets	of	Confiscation	by	Occupation,	1750-1839	
Occupation	 Frequency	 Percent		
Military	Officials	(Askeriye)	 267	 26.25	Administrative	 and	 Palace	Officials	(Kalemiye-Saray)	 231	 22.71	Legal	Officials	(İlmiye)	 11	 1.08	
Provincial	Elites	(Ayan)	 349	 34.32	
Merchants	(Tüccar)	 47	 4.62	Artisans	(Esnaf)	 9	 0.88	Moneychangers	(Sarraf)	 13	 1.28	Peasants	(Köylü)	 47	 4.62	Missing	 43	 4.23	Total	 1017	 100	
Source:	See	appendix	B	for	data	sources.	the	wealth-holder,	the	protocol	almost	invariably	specifies	their	location.	Normally,	the	location	is	detailed	down	to	village	level.	But	a	high	majority	of	the	individuals	targeted	
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were	urban	dwellers.	Finally,	the	size	and	distribution	of	wealth	was	obtained	from	the	actual	list	of	assets	and/or	the	section	of	calculation	at	the	end	of	inventories.	
Table	1	shows	that	the	prime	targets	of	confiscation	were	private	tax	contractors	and	gov-ernment	officials.	The	first	three	rows	represent	state	officials	expressed	in	three	catego-ries,	 i.e.	military,	 administrative	 and	 legal	 officials.	 The	 fourth	 row	displays	 provincial	elites	who	were	involved	in	the	business	of	governance	as	private	tax	contractors	yet	were	not	officially	affiliated	with	the	center.	It	can	therefore	be	argued	that	at	least	83	per	cent	of	the	targets	of	confiscation	were	those	benefiting	from	the	fiscal	system.	In	other	words,	people	engaged	in	productive	economic	activities	such	as	commerce	and	industry	were	not	under	direct	threat.	As	the	table	displays,	merchants	and	peasants	represent	4	per	cent	of	the	sample	population.5	Similarly,	the	shares	of	artisans	and	moneychangers	are	quite	marginal,	both	around	1	per	cent.	Among	these	findings,	the	most	surprising	one	is	the	relatively	high	proportion	of	peasants.	To	figure	out	why	the	wealth	of	ordinary	peas-ants	was	being	confiscated,	we	need	to	look	at	how	these	were	justified.	It	appears	that	21	out	of	28	confiscations	of	peasant	wealth	for	which	I	could	identity	official	justification,	out	of	a	total	of	47,	were	crime-related.	These	were	invariably	due	to	their	participation	in	rebellion	as	the	only	type	of	crime	they	could	commit	against	the	central	state.	Figure	1	demonstrates	the	temporal	changes	in	the	frequencies	of	the	targets	of	confiscation	ex-pressed	as	a	percentage	of	 total	number	 in	 the	decades	during	 the	period	1750-1839.	What	is	most	striking	in	this	figure	is	that	it	shows	a	boom	in	the	number	of	local	elites	compared	to	the	other	groups.	The	figure	reveals	that	starting	from	13	per	cent	in	1750-1759	the	share	of	provincial	elites	moves	around	40	per	cent	between	1780	and	1820.	The	period	1780-1820	was	a	time	of	centralizing	efforts.	The	power	of	major	provincial	power-holders	was	curbed	by	the	1820s.	
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Figure	1.		
Occupational	Distribution	of	Confiscation	Targets	over	Time	
	
Source:	See	appendix	B	for	data	sources.	
A	high	majority	of	the	targets	of	confiscation	included	in	the	dataset	are	Muslim	men.	Due	to	the	lack	of	population	data,	it	is	not	possible	to	argue	in	relative	terms	that	non-Muslims	faced	 less	 confiscation.	However,	 if	 the	data	must	be	 trusted,	 two	 factors	explain	why.	First,	they	were	generally	not	allowed	to	serve	as	government	officials	except	for	those	in	translation	and	minting.	Likewise,	they	were	not	able	to	bid	in	tax	farming	auctions	either,	though	they	were	involved	in	the	fiscal	system	as	moneylenders	who	lent	to	tax	farmers	needing	capital.	Second,	those	non-Muslim	financiers	and	merchants,	who	constituted	the	majority	in	these	professions	in	the	eighteenth	century,	mostly	operated	under	the	legal	protection	of	major	European	powers.	That	is,	European	consulates	in	the	Ottoman	lands	were	selling	property	rights	to	Greeks	and	Armenians,	who	were	hired	by	consulates	as	
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dragoman	(translators)	though	only	on	paper	(Kuran	2010:	199).	Regardless	of	European	protection	of	non-Muslims,	the	Ottoman	center	must	have	recognized	the	role	of	trade	for	prosperity	 and	developed	a	new	 institutional	 framework,	 guaranteeing	 the	 security	of	property	and	life	of	merchants	(Kaymakcı	2013:	16-36).	
Map	1.		
Frequencies	of	Confiscation	Attempts	in	Ottoman	Locations	and	Provinces,	1750-1839	
	
Source:	See	appendix	B	for	data	sources.	
Notes:	Provincial	borders	shown	here	are	approximately	drawn	based	on	a	geocoded	map	created	by	Har-
vard	Geospatial	Library	accessed	at	http://hgl.harvard.edu:8080/opengeoportal/	on	18	January	2017.	This	
map	displays	provincial	borders	of	the	Ottoman	Empire,	circa	1790.	The	Kaptanpaşa	province	is	shown	in	the	
middle	of	Aegean	Sea	as	it	did	not	have	clear-cut	territories.	Similarly,	those	confiscations	conducted	in	fron-
tier	castles	are	shown	at	the	top	of	the	Black	Sea	under	the	name	of	‘Frontier	Castles.’	How	was	the	confiscation	activity	distributed	spatially?	Map	1	displays	spatial	frequency	of	confiscation	at	both	location	and	province	levels.	The	map	illustrates	that	the	largest	number	of	confiscations	took	place	 in	Istanbul,	 followed	by	such	major	cities	as	Bursa,	
14		
Antalya	and	Manisa.	The	common	feature	of	most	cities	with	a	higher	number	of	confisca-tions	is	that	they	are	either	coastal	or	very	close	to	the	coast.	This	finding	leads	to	two	potential	hypotheses.	First,	coastal	regions	could	be	more	appealing	since	they	were	rel-atively	developed	due	to	greater	commercial	exchange	stemming	from	port	presence	and	favorable	climate.	But	that	merchants	were	not	confiscated	much	disproves	this	hypoth-esis.	It	seems	more	likely	that	undertaking	confiscations	on	the	coast	was	less	expensive	because	sea	transport	was	historically	cheaper	than	inland	transport.	Whether	this	was	the	case	is	left	as	an	open	question	to	be	answered	in	the	next	section.		
Figure	2.	
Frequencies	of	Confiscation	Attempts	and	Full	Confiscation,	1750-1839	
	
Source:	See	appendix	B	for	data	sources.	Figure	2	gives	a	broad	sense	of	the	timing	of	confiscations.	The	blue	area	shows	the	annual	number	of	confiscation	attempts	while	the	red	area	represents	the	number	of	cases	which	
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resulted	in	full	confiscation.	Apart	from	the	years	with	dramatic	falls,	number	of	confisca-tion	attempts	follows	a	generally	increasing	trend	after	the	1770s,	coinciding	with	the	de-terioration	 of	 state	 finances	 after	 the	Russo-Ottoman	war	 of	 1768-1774.	A	 decreasing	trend	begins	after	1820,	continuing	until	the	abolition	in	1839.	This	is	overall	in	line	with	the	view	that	the	crisis	triggers	confiscation	activity.	However,	it	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	proportion	of	‘full	confiscation’	outcome	in	total	number	of	attempts	falls	during	the	time	of	crisis.	Like	in	the	case	of	spatial	patterns,	this	is	also	a	question	that	can	be	best	studied	with	an	econometric	approach.			
5 Empirical	Strategy	and	Descriptive	Statistics	Empirical	strategy	adopted	in	this	paper	builds	on	two	unique	features	of	the	process	of	Ottoman	confiscations.	The	first	one	is	that	the	enforcement	of	confiscation	was	most	typ-ically	a	two-step	process	as	described	below,	though	various	scenarios	were	possible	de-pending	on	whether	it	was	conducted	after	one’s	normal	death	or	punishment	(See:	Fig-ure	3).	Second,	the	process	did	not	necessarily	end	with	confiscation	of	all	assets.	The	first	step	is	the	step	before	an	inventory	was	made.	Once	informed	by	a	potential	case	of	con-fiscation,	the	sultan	and	his	agents	follow	one	of	the	strategies	below:		
	 Outcome	1	
n Send	confiscator	
n No	confiscation	
n Inheritance	Tax	
Importantly,	this	initial	decision	was	made	without	full	information	on	the	attributes	of	wealth	because	there	was	no	existing	inventory	yet.	Only	if	the	outcome	of	the	first	step	
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was	“send	confiscator,”	the	process	proceeded	to	the	second	step.	By	sending	a	confisca-tor,	the	center	already	incurred	the	costs	of	agency	no	matter	what	the	outcome	of	the	second	step	would	be.	The	outcome	of	“no	confiscation”	refers	to	the	waiving	of	confisca-tion,	which	resulted	in	no	further	action.	The	“inheritance	tax”	outcome	implies	that	the	family	were	to	pay	the	amount	of	cash	set	by	the	central	administration	or	offered	by	the	family.	This	amount	was	mostly	open	to	negotiation.	
Figure	3.		
Steps	of	Confiscation	Process	
	
The	second	step	is	the	one	lasting	from	the	sending	of	a	confiscator	until	the	end	of	the	process.	Its	main	difference	from	the	first	step	is	the	revealing	of	more	information	gath-ered	from	the	prepared	inventory.	At	this	step,	the	sultan	and	his	agents	possess	more	precise	information	on	the	family’s	power	and	the	attributes	of	their	wealth,	such	as	its	net	value	and	liquidity.	With	this	revealed	information,	the	question	of	how	worthwhile	it	is	to	confiscate	becomes	clearer.	The	process	ends	with	one	of	the	following	outcomes:		
	 Outcome	2	
n Confiscation	
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n No	confiscation	
n Inheritance	Tax	
Table	2.	
Definitions	of	Explanatory	Variables	
Variable	name	 Definition	
WAR	 War	pressure	index	based	on	war	casualties.	REBELLION	 The	 number	 of	 internal	 conflicts	including	 revolutionary	 move-ments.	DISTANCE	 Interaction	of	distance	from	Istan-bul	and	distance	from	a	port.	RELIGION	 1	if	Muslim,	0	if	non-Muslim.	
GENDER	 1	if	female,	0	if	male.		TITLE	 1	if	the	wealth-holder	has	a	title,	0	if	he	does	not.		FAMILY	 1	if	the	wealth-holder	is	a	member	of	a	prominent	family,	0	if	not.		WARZONE	 Distance	of	the	wealth-holder’s		ELAPSED	 The	number	of	years	elapsed	after	enthronement	of	the	sultan.	JUSTIFY	 1	if	justified,	0	if	not.	NET	VALUE	 Net	value	of	the	wealth	in	tons	of	silver.	LIQUIDITY	 Percentage	 of	 liquid	 assets,	 jew-elry,	 slaves	 and	watches,	 to	 total	assets.		The	main	dependent	variable	of	the	analysis	is	thus	the	outcome	of	the	confiscation	pro-cess.	It	is	a	categorical	variable	taking	two	different	forms,	outcome	1	and	outcome	2,	in	the	two	multinomial	logistic	models.	One	would	ideally	employ	the	exact	share	of	confis-cated	wealth	to	the	total	value	of	wealth.	It	was	impossible,	however,	to	identify	this	pro-portion	for	all	cases,	though	I	was	more	successful	in	determining	which	of	the	above	cat-egories	each	confiscation	fell	into.		
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The	analysis	employs	multinomial	 logistic	 regression	model	 (MNLM)	 to	estimate	what	determined	the	‘outcome’	of	the	two	steps	of	the	process	of	confiscation.6	MNLM	is	a	type	of	logistic	model	used	when	the	number	of	dependent	variable	categories	is	greater	than	two	and	there	is	no	natural	order	between	them.	The	formal	models	are	presented	in	the	two-step	framework	identified	above.	The	information	in	the	step	each	confiscation	out-come	has	happened	has	been	gathered	from	a	pool	of	over	7,000	correspondence	docu-ments.			
Table	3.	
Frequency	Table	of	the	Dependent	Variable,	‘Outcome’	
Source:	See	appendix	B	for	data	sources.	
Outcomes	 Frequency	 Relative	frequency	
All	 	 	Confiscation	 601	 59.10	No	Confiscation	 214	 21.04	Inheritance	Tax	 202	 19.86	
Total	 1017	 100	
Step	1	 	 	Send	confiscator	 832	 81.81	No	confiscation	 110	 10.82	Inheritance	tax	 75	 7.37	
Total	 1017	 100	
Step	2	 	 	Confiscation	 601	 72.24	No	confiscation	 104	 12.50	Inheritance	tax	 127	 15.26	
Total	 832	 100	
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In	explaining	the	determinants	of	state	confiscation,	the	impact	of	the	following	factors	on	the	outcomes	of	the	process	of	confiscation	are	of	special	interest:	(1)	conflicts	or	deteri-orating	state	finances,	(2)	geographical	limitations,	(3)	bargaining	power	of	families,	and	(4)	attributes	of	wealth	such	as	magnitude	and	liquidity.		
Table	4.	
Frequency	Table	and	Descriptive	Statistics	of	Explanatory	Variables	
Source:	See	appendix	B	for	data	sources.	
Variable	Name	 Min	 Max	 Mean	 SD	 Freq.	 Relative	
Freq.	
Obser-
vation	War	 0.007	 0.302	 0.134	 0.107	 	 	 1017	Rebellion	 0	 4	 0.74	 0.90	 	 	 1017	Distance	Istanbul	 1	 2409.02	 374.43	 367.36	 	 	 1017	Distance	Port	 1.64	 1454.26	 269.53	 173.19	 	 	 1017	Elapsed	 0	 31	 10.16	 6.82	 	 	 1017	Net	Value	 -33.12	 106.08	 1.13	 5.57	 	 	 828	Liquidity	 0	 100	 29.00	 33.12	 	 	 357	
Justify	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Yes	 	 	 	 	 305	 70.01	 1017	No	 	 	 	 	 712	 29.99	 	
Gender	Male	Female	
	 	 	 	 	979	38	
	96.26	3.74	
	1017	
Religion	Muslim	Non-Mus.	
	 	 	 	 	957	60	
	94.10	5.90	
	1017	
Family	Yes	No	
	 	 	 	 	135	882	
	86.73	13.27	
	1017	
Title	Yes	No	
	 	 	 	 	306	771	
		 	1017	
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In	doing	so,	 I	 control	 for	a	set	of	variables	such	as	one’s	 identity,	 the	number	of	years	elapsed	after	 the	ruling	sultan’s	enthronement,	and	 the	way	confiscation	was	 justified.	The	variable	WAR	is	used	to	estimate	whether	wars	have	driven	confiscations.7	Due	to	the	lack	of	data	on	state	revenues,	it	also	serves	the	function	of	proxying	fiscal	distress	as	most	revenues	were	spent	on	wars	during	the	chosen	period.	Instead	of	the	number	of	wars,	which	would	not	capture	their	magnitude,	I	use	a	war	pressure	index	based	on	the	number	of	causalities.	Another	potential	determinant	of	the	decision	to	confiscate	could	be	inter-nal	conflicts,	since	this	was	a	period	of	rebellions	and	independence	movements.	Unlike	wars,	there	is	no	data	on	causalities	from	domestic	conflicts.	Thus,	I	use	a	dummy	variable	reflecting	the	number	of	rebellions	that	took	place	in	each	year	of	confiscation.	To	meas-ure	the	impact	of	spatiality	or	of	the	direct	costs	of	confiscation,	I	use	an	interacted	dis-tance	variable,	DISTANCE.	This	variable	is	an	interaction	of	distance	from	Istanbul	(the	destination	of	confiscated	assets)	and	distance	from	major	ports.8	
As	 for	bargaining	power,	 the	analysis	employs	 two	variables.	One	of	 them	is	a	dummy	variable	called	FAMILY,	showing	whether	the	wealth-holder	was	a	member	of	a	prominent	family.	Admittedly,	this	variable	has	certain	limits.	The	family’s	bargaining	power	vis-à-vis	the	ruler	is	indeed	the	matter	of	a	complex	long-term	relationship,	reflecting	not	only	how	much	the	sovereign	values	the	past	conduct	of	the	family	but	also	how	he	thinks	his	dependence	on	the	family	will	change	in	future.	It	is	not	possible	to	know	the	entire	his-tory	of	these	mutual	interdependences	between	the	center	and	all	1,017	families.	The	po-tential	weakness	of	this	variable	is	then	mitigated	using	another	variable	of	bargaining	power.	After	considering	that	wars	were	important	for	the	nature	of	dependence	between	the	sultan	and	the	confiscation	targets,	I	created	the	variable	WARZONE,	which	is	the	dis-tance	from	the	nearest	warzone	at	the	time	of	confiscation.9	It	captures	how	the	existence	of	a	war	nearby	impacted	the	decision	to	confiscate	the	wealth	of	the	family.		
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In	the	second-step	regression,	I	introduce	two	additional	variables	regarding	the	wealth	under	target.	Both	are	used	to	measure	whether	the	outcome	was	shaped	by	cost-benefit	calculation.	 The	 variable	NETVALUE	 represents	 the	 transferable	 amount	 of	 capital.	LI-
QUIDITY,	which	could	be	calculated	only	in	357	cases,	shows	the	proportion	of	liquid	as-sets	such	as	jewelry,	cash,	slaves	and	watches	to	total	assets.	Variables	used	in	the	first	step	and	included	in	the	second	step	regression	are	those	that	are	time-specific	that	could	have	changed	during	the	process	of	confiscation,	which	could	at	times	take	years.				
6 Results	and	Discussion	The	main	results	of	the	MNL	models	are	presented	in	tables	5,	6,	7	and	8.	The	independ-ence	of	irrelevant	alternatives	assumption	inherent	in	the	MNLM	was	tested	with	a	Haus-man-McFadden	test	(Hausman	and	McFadden	1984).	The	results	are	reported	in	relative	risks	rather	than	coefficients	as	the	latter’s	interpretation	in	the	MLNM	are	inconvenient.	Interpreting	relative	risks	is	like	that	of	the	odds	ratios	in	binary	choice	models.	That	is,	relative	risk	reflects	the	change	for	a	one-unit	change	in	the	independent	variables.	Each	regression	treats	a	category	of	the	outcome	variable	as	base	category.	The	first-step	re-gression	uses	‘send	confiscator’	as	its	main	base	category	since	the	decision	to	send	a	con-fiscator	means	incurring	agency	costs	regardless	of	the	outcome	of	the	second	step	and	is	costlier	than	the	other	two	outcomes,	namely	‘no	confiscation’	and	‘inheritance	tax.’	Be-cause	sending	a	confiscator	has	greater	costs,	it	is	more	convenient	to	interpret	the	results	compared	to	the	category	of	‘send	confiscator.’	The	main	reference	category	for	the	se-cond-step	regression	is	‘confiscation’	simply	because	the	other	outcomes	represent	either	a	lesser	degree	of	confiscation	(inheritance	tax)	or	no	confiscation	at	all.	Where	necessary,	I	also	take	another	category	as	reference	category	to	see	the	interaction	between	the	other	two	outcomes,	which	is	not	shown	by	one	single	comparison.		
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6.1 First-Step	Estimates	The	first-step	estimates	are	given	in	table	5.	Before	proceeding	to	the	impact	of	wars	and	expected	costs,	it	is	necessary	to	have	a	brief	look	at	two	seemingly	surprising	results.	At	first	 sight,	 the	direction	of	 the	relative	 risk	of	TITLE	seems	surprising.	 It	 suggests	 that	holding	a	title	increases	the	odds	of	the	outcome	‘send	confiscator’	compared	to	both	com-parison	groups	of	‘inheritance	tax’	and	‘no	confiscation.’	That	is,	the	central	government	was	more	willing	to	continue	the	process	of	confiscation	if	the	wealth-holder	had	a	title.	One	may	think	that	title-holders	would	be	more	capable	of	escaping	confiscation	due	to	their	better	bargaining	position.	Yet	we	must	consider	here	that	all	who	benefited	from	the	ruler’s	revenue	pie	were	title-holders	one	way	or	another.	What	this	implies	is	that	a	person	with	no	title	could	be	tolerated	more	than	one	with	a	title.		
ELAPSED	represents	the	number	of	years	that	elapsed	after	the	enthronement	of	the	rul-ing	sultan.	As	it	goes	up,	‘send	confiscator’	is	the	least	likely	outcome,	while	‘no	confisca-tion’	is	more	likely	than	‘inheritance	tax.’	In	other	words,	the	longer	the	sultan	stays	in	power,	the	less	likely	he	is	to	continue	the	process	of	confiscation.	If	we	assume	that	ruling	for	longer	makes	the	sovereign	more	powerful	and	able	to	confiscate,	this	result	curiously	refers	to	a	negative	relationship	between	power	and	confiscation.	A	potential	explanation	for	 the	 first	 result	 is	 that	 sultans	were	arguably	more	 interested	 in	confiscation	 in	 the	early	years	of	their	rule	to	finance	their	projects.	Or,	the	above	assumption	does	not	hold	true	that	their	power	just	deteriorated	with	time.		
An	insignificant	result	needs	also	to	be	interpreted.	FAMILY	is	not	significant	in	both	com-parisons	shown	in	columns	1	and	2	because	it	was	only	after	certain	attributes	of	wealth	were	revealed	via	an	inventory	that	a	healthier	analysis	of	the	political	costs	and	benefits	of	confiscation	could	occur.	Since	 ‘no	confiscation’	and	‘inheritance	tax’	were	outcomes	
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that	could	also	be	realized	in	the	second	step,	the	central	government	possibly	did	not	want	to	decide	before	the	value	and	liquidity	of	wealth	was	revealed	by	the	confiscator.		
6.1.1 War	Pressure:	A	Driver	of	Confiscation?	It	is	generally	argued	that	under	fiscal	distress	created	by	external	and	internal	wars,	rul-ers	confiscate	more	of	the	wealth	of	their	subjects.	First-step	estimates	reported	here	re-fer	to	an	adverse	relationship	between	war	pressure	and	confiscation	options	of	the	sov-ereign.	The	relative	risks	of	WAR	shown	in	panels	1	and	2	of	table	5	reveal	that	one-unit	increase	in	war	pressure	makes	the	category	of	‘send	confiscator,’	8.852	times	less	likely	than	‘no	confiscation’	and	6.860	times	less	likely	than	‘inheritance	tax.’	This	is	to	say	that	in	relative	terms,	an	increase	in	war	pressure	made	the	Ottoman	rulers	choose	not	to	con-fiscate	or	obtain	inheritance	tax	over	continuing	the	process	of	confiscation	by	sending	a	confiscator.		
There	might	be	two	reasons	why.	First,	the	time	and	resources	of	the	center	were	spent	on	warzones	during	wartime.	Unlike	full	confiscation	which	could	have	occurred	at	the	end	of	the	second	step,	inheritance	tax	was	a	quick	and	low-cost	alternative	even	though	extracted	revenue	was	lower.	The	second	reason	is	related	to	the	symbiotic	relationship	between	the	center	and	some	targets	of	confiscations.	Relative	risks	of	1.068	and	0.907	shown	in	the	row	of	WARZONE	lends	further	support	to	this	mutuality.	They	imply	that	the	proximity	of	the	physical	location	of	wealth	to	a	warzone	at	the	time	of	confiscation	attempt	made	‘no	confiscation’	more	likely	relative	to	both	‘send	confiscator’	and	‘inher-itance	tax.’	In	other	words,	the	more	proximate	to	a	warzone,	the	more	they	were	able	to	escape	confiscation.	Like	in	the	opening	anecdote,	this	finding	shows	that	elite	coopera-tion	was	more	needed	during	wartime.	It	also	helps	to	understand	why	‘inheritance	tax’	is	not	necessarily	superior	to	 ‘no	confiscation’	as	expressed	in	the	insignificant	relative	
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risks	of	WAR.	To	be	more	precise,	though	inheritance	tax	pays	better	than	no	confiscation	in	terms	of	its	monetary	value,	during	wartime	monetary	value	was	not	necessarily	the		
Table	5.		
Relative	Risks	of	the	Outcome	of	the	First	Step	of	the	Process	of	Confiscation	
Source:	See	appendix	B	for	data	sources	
Notes:	***,	**,	and	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	1,	5,	and	10	per	cent	levels.	C:	Confiscation,	NC:	No	
Confiscation,	IT:	Inheritance	Tax.	The	reference	category	is	always	the	one	after	/.	If	relative	risk	is	greater	
DV	categories	 NC/SC	 IT/SC	 IT/NC	Conflict	 Interstate	Wars	 8.852**	 6.860*	 0.774	Rebellion	 0.899	 0.888	 0.987	Spatiality	 Distance	 1.482***	 1.863***	 1.256						Identity	
Gender	 	 	 				Male	 1	 1	 1				Female	 0.224	 0.791	 3.521	Religion	 	 	 				Muslim	 1	 1	 1				Non-Muslim	 0.675	 0.922	 1.480	Title	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 0.336***	 0.346***	 1.032		Bargaining	Power	
Family	Affiliation	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 1.215	 0.592	 0.487	Warzone	 1.068**	 0.969	 0.907**	Sultan	Behavior	 Elapsed	 1.067***	 1.003***	 0.939**	Rules			
Justification	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 0.308***	 0.581**	 1.882*		 N	 1015	 1015	 1.015		 Pseudo	R2	 0.1485	 0.1485	 0.1485		 LR	Chi2	 180.25	 180.25	 180.25		 Prob	Chi2	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	
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than	1,	the	odds	of	reference	category	are	higher	compared	to	the	comparison	category.	If	it	is	lower	than	1,	
the	outcome	is	more	likely	to	fall	in	the	comparison	group.		most	 important	element	of	 the	process.	Elites’	military	support	was	much	needed	and	confiscating	their	wealth	was	not	the	priority	of	the	sultan.		
Although	another	variable	of	conflict,	REBELLION	is	not	significant,	it	refers	to	a	reverse	relationship	between	conflict	and	confiscation.	That	is,	with	more	rebellion	happening	at	the	time	of	confiscation	attempt,	the	sovereign	was	more	likely	to	send	a	confiscator.	The	reason	why	this	result	is	the	opposite	of	that	of	WAR	is	that	confiscations	were	sometimes	the	result	of	rebellion.	This	cannot	be	confirmed	though	as	the	result	is	not	significant.		
6.1.2 Expected	Costs:	A	Constraint	of	Confiscation?	Expected	costs	of	confiscation	also	had	an	impact	on	the	outcome	of	the	first	step.	The	relative	risk	of	DISTANCE	is	higher	than	1,	which	means	that	an	increase	in	expected	costs	made	both	‘no	confiscation’	and	‘inheritance	tax’	more	likely	compared	to	‘send	confisca-tor.’	With	increased	distance	from	Istanbul	and	major	ports,	the	sultan	would	prefer	to	not	continue	the	process,	by	not	sending	a	confiscator.	When	it	comes	to	the	decision	be-tween	‘no	confiscation’	and	‘inheritance	tax’	in	a	distant	location,	he	is	rather	indifferent.	This	decision	is	determined	by	the	proximity	to	a	warzone,	time	elapsed	after	enthrone-ment	of	the	sultan	and	whether	there	was	a	justification	(See:	IT-NC	comparison).	These	findings	are	consistent	with	the	expected	transport	costs	hypothesis	as	they	demonstrate	that	the	sultan	is	more	hesitant	to	confiscate	in	remote	areas.	Another	reason	distance	matters	can	be	that	the	power	of	the	center	generally	decreases	with	distance	from	the	capital.	Less	power	or	legitimacy	increases	the	expectance	of	resistance	that	would	result	in	undesired	costs.		
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6.2 Second-Step	Estimates	
Table	6.	
Relative	Risks	of	the	Outcome	of	the	Second	Step	of	the	Process	of	Confiscation	
Source:	See	appendix	B		for	data	sources.	
Notes:	***,	**,	and	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	1,	5,	and	10	per	cent	levels.	C:	Confiscation,	NC:	No	
Confiscation,	IT:	Inheritance	Tax.	The	reference	category	is	always	the	one	after	/.	If	relative	risk	is	greater	
than	1,	the	odds	of	reference	category	are	higher	compared	to	the	comparison	category.	If	it	is	lower	than	1,	
the	outcome	is	more	likely	to	fall	in	the	comparison	group.		The	second-step	estimates	are	shown	in	table	6.	It	reports	the	results	with	and	without	
LIQUIDITY	 in	panels	1	and	2.	The	second	part	of	dependent	variable	categories	are	the	base	categories.	The	most	striking	result	in	this	table	is	the	relative	risks	of	NETVALUE,	which	is	highly	significant	in	all	columns.	Those	in	the	first	two	columns	show	that	as	the	value	of	wealth	increases,	the	sultan	is	more	likely	to	confiscate	relative	to	‘no	confisca-tion.’	However,	the	same	is	not	true	with	‘inheritance	tax.’	It	appears	that	the	likelihood	of	inheritance	tax	was	higher	for	high	value	inheritances	in	comparison	with	confiscation.		
	
	 	 1	 	 	 2	 	
DV	categories	 NC/C	 IT/C	 IT/NC	 NC/C	 IT/C	 IT/NC	
Conflict	 Interstate	Wars	 1.893	 4.937*	 0.528	 11.973	 19.582**	 1.635	Rebellion	 1.152	 1.162	 1.008	 1.888**	 1.119	 0.593	
Wealth	 Net	Value	 0.691***	 1.293***	 1.870***	 0.595***	 1.323***	 2.220***	Liquidity		 	 	 	 0.968**	 0.954***	 0.985		
	
Bar-
gaining	
Power	
Family	Affilia-tion	 	 	 	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 1.839	 4.906***	 2.667**	 1.833	 4.819***	 2.628	Warzone	 0.935*	 1.051	 1.123**	 0.993	 1.028	 1.035		 N	 774	 774	 774	 344	 344	 344		 Pseudo	R2	 0.1247	 0.1247	 0.1247	 0.2512	 0.2512	 0.2512		 LR	Chi2	 138.71	 138.71	 138.71	 116.62	 116.62	 116.62		 Prob	Chi2	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	
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Figure	4.	
Graphs	of	Correlation	in	the	First	and	Second-Step	Regressions		
	
	
Source:	See	bibliography	for	data	sources.	
Notes:	These	figures	does	not	show	results	in	relative	terms.	Although	changes	might	not	seem	sig-
nificant,	it	must	be	considered	that	the	likelihood	of	sending	a	confiscator	was	already	much	higher	than	
those	of	other	outcomes	at	0.	
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Figure	4	clearly	shows	the	impact	of	an	increase	in	net	wealth	on	the	outcome	of	the	con-fiscation	process.	Until	a	point,	it	increases	the	likelihood	of	confiscation	relative	to	both	‘no	confiscation’	and	 ‘inheritance	tax.’	But	after	that	point,	 the	confiscation-inheritance	tax	comparison	changes	 in	a	way	that	 inheritance	tax	becomes	more	 likely.	This	 is	 the	explanation	of	the	reverse	U-shape	that	can	be	seen	in	the	figure.	
This	finding	is	better	read	in	combination	with	the	value	of	relative	risks	of	FAMILY.	That	is,	being	a	member	of	a	prominent	family	increases	the	probability	of	the	‘inheritance	tax’	outcome	compared	to	 ‘confiscation’	by	a	 factor	of	4.906	and	4.819	with	or	without	LI-
QUIDITY	respectively.	This	 is	closely	related	to	their	power	to	bargain	with	the	central	government	primarily	but	not	exclusively	for	the	reasons	mentioned	above.	Another	var-iable	of	bargaining	power,	WARZONE,	still	has	the	same	effect	as	in	the	first-step	models	in	that	it	increases	the	likelihood	of	‘no	confiscation’	relative	to	the	other	two	categories.		
To	evaluate	these	results	in	light	of	qualitative	sources,	prominent	families	used	their	mil-itary,	economic	and	political	sources	of	power	to	negotiate	the	institution	of	inheritance	tax	and	even	sometimes	succeeded	in	reducing	the	amount	of	it.	Thus,	the	interpretation	of	the	variable	FAMILY	helps	to	explain	why	inheritance	tax	was	more	likely	to	occur	with	an	increase	in	the	amount	of	wealth.	The	reason	why	family	affiliation	is	significant	in	the	second	step	and	not	in	the	first	step	is	that	the	first	step	outcome	is	of	more	of	a	decision	while	that	of	the	second	step	is	not	necessarily	so.	As	an	outcome,	 it	reflects	a	process	during	which	both	parties	test	their	power.		
Panel	2	of	table	6	reports	the	results	with	LIQUIDITY	added	as	one	of	explanatory	varia-bles.	Unfortunately,	the	number	of	observations	is	inevitably	reduced	to	344	due	to	the	lack	of	liquidity	data	for	many	observations.	In	panel	2,	we	see	that	liquidity	is	highly	cor-related	with	the	outcome	of	the	second	step.	More	liquid	assets	were	not	only	more	easily	
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convertible	but	 also	more	easily	 transferable.	As	asset	 liquidity	 increases,	 confiscation	turns	into	a	more	likely	outcome	relative	to	both	comparison	outcomes.	An	additional	re-gression	with	‘no	confiscation’	as	the	base	category	was	also	estimated	and	presented	in	the	last	column	of	the	table.	The	insignificant	relative	risks	of	LIQUIDITY	in	the	inheritance	tax-no	 confiscation	 comparison	 indicate	 that	 the	 sultan	was	 somewhat	 indifferent	 be-tween	these	categories	as	liquidity	level	changed.		
Overall,	 the	value	and	liquidity	of	wealth	as	well	as	the	bargaining	power	of	the	family	predict	a	good	deal	of	the	second	step	outcome.	When	the	confiscation	process	reaches	this	step,	the	central	government	takes	a	final	look	at	the	confiscation	inventory	and	the	outcome	is	determined	partly	by	the	center	and	partly	by	‘nature’	depending	on	the	spe-cifics	of	the	case.	
6.3 Robustness	Checks	Appendix	table	A1	accounts	for	all	variables	without	considering	steps	and	liquidity,	while	appendix	table	A2	does	the	same	with	liquidity.	Panel	1	of	these	tables	shows	the	results	with	log	transformed	net	value,	while	the	second	panel	uses	the	actual	value	of	wealth.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	logged	net	value	reduces	the	number	of	observations	although	log	transformation	is	generally	better	for	our	purposes	due	to	the	very	high	standard	de-viation	of	that	variable.	Most	results	are	consistent	with	the	step	regressions	in	tables	5	and	6.	However,	inconsistent	ones	do	not	weaken	but	strengthen	my	analysis	since	they	justify	the	use	of	the	two-step	framework.	If	we	focus	on	the	results	that	are	inconsistent	with	step	regressions,	we	first	notice	that	the	impact	of	interstate	wars	becomes	less	vis-ible	when	considered	without	steps.	Nevertheless,	‘inheritance	tax’	still	proves	to	be	sig-nificant	more	likely	than	‘confiscation’	with	an	increase	in	war	pressure.	Although	it	is	not	
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significant,	 the	sign	of	 the	relative	risks	of	no	confiscation-confiscation	comparison	re-mains	the	same.	Another	difference	of	the	regressions	without	two-step	framework	is	that	even	though	the	sultan	was	indifferent	between	‘no	confiscation’	and	‘inheritance	tax’	as	expected	transport	costs	increased,	here	is	more	likely	to	obtain	inheritance	tax	rather	than	waiving	confiscation.		
Table	7.	
Relative	Risks	of	the	Mode	of	Transfer	of	Confiscated	Wealth	
Source:	See	bibliography	for	data	sources.	
Notes:	***,	**,	and	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	1,	5,	and	10	per	cent	levels.	SK:	Sent	in	Kind,	M:	
Mixed,	SC:	Sent	in	Cash.	The	reference	category	is	always	the	one	after	/.	If	relative	risk	is	greater	than	1,	the	
odds	of	reference	category	are	higher	compared	to	the	comparison	category.	If	it	is	lower	than	1,	the	outcome	
is	more	likely	to	fall	in	the	comparison	group.		Second,	I	test	the	impact	of	cost-benefit	calculation	in	an	alternative	analysis.	This	looks	specifically	at	the	role	of	transportation	costs.	If	the	outcome	of	the	confiscation	process	was	confiscation,	the	next	decision	of	the	government	was	how	to	transfer	confiscation	gains	to	the	public	treasury.	It	must	be	noted	at	the	outset	that	the	analysis	excludes	those	gains	that	were	occasionally	sent	directly	to	warzones	for	military	use.	Apart	from	that,	there	were	three	modes	of	transfer:	(1)	transportation	of	all	assets	to	Istanbul	in	kind,	(2)	auctioning	all	assets	on	premise	and	transferring	revenues	in	cash	and	(3)	a	mix	of	these	
	 1	(W/O	Liquidity)	 2	(W	Liquidity)	
DV	categories	 SK/SC	 M/SC	 SK/SC	 M/SC	
Wealth	 Net	Value	 0.935**	 0.992*	 0.859*	 1.404**	Liquidity	 	 	 1.034***	 1.019**	
Seasonality	 Month	Included	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Spatiality	 Distance	 1.553***	 1.744***	 1.738***	 1.713***		 N	 633	 633	 290	 290		 Pseudo	R2	 0.1563	 0.1563	 0.3050	 0.3050		 LR	Chi2	 133.48	 133.48	 143.96	 143.96		 Prob	Chi2	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
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modes.	 Independent	variables	 included	in	the	model	are	an	interaction	variable	of	dis-tance	from	Istanbul	and	distance	from	the	nearest	major	port,	the	month	of	confiscation,	net	value	of	wealth	and	liquidity.	In	contrast	to	previous	regressions,	the	month	of	confis-cation	controls	here	for	the	effect	of	seasonality	or	whether	climate	or	any	other	features	of	seasonality	had	an	impact	on	the	decision.	If	the	decision	to	transfer	was	governed	by	minimization	of	transport	costs,	then	this	test	should	provide	further	proof	for	the	above	argument	that	cost-benefit	calculation	played	an	important	role	even	in	this	stage	which	we	might	call	the	third	stage	of	the	process.		
As	 displayed	 in	 table	 7,	 controlling	 for	 other	 variables,	 two	 of	 three	 variables	 of	 im-portance	lend	support	to	the	cost-benefit	argument.	This	includes	the	finding	that	as	the	size	of	wealth	increases,	it	becomes	more	likely	for	it	to	be	sent	in	cash.	That	is,	auctions	were	more	often	held	in	more	distant	regions.	There	were	presumably	costs	of	auction,	but	these	costs	can	be	negligibly	included	in	the	costs	of	agency	that	were	already	paid.	As	the	liquidity	increases,	the	assets	are	more	likely	to	be	sent	in	kind.	This	is	because,	in	contrast	to	property	such	as	real	estate,	liquid	assets	were	easily	moveable.	Most	liquid	assets	in	the	dataset	are	jewelries	and	cash.	Yet	the	distance	variables	in	the	table	do	not	support	our	hypothesis.	The	distance	from	Istanbul	suggests	that	the	more	distant	a	loca-tion	was;	the	more	likely	assets	were	to	be	sent	in	kind.	
Finally,	one	can	also	look	at	the	official	reasoning	behind	the	non-confiscation	outcomes.	150	cases,	for	which	I	could	identify	the	reasoning,	support	the	argument	that	confisca-tions	were	conducted	in	light	of	cost	minimization.	If	we	look	at	the	stated	reasons	behind	‘no	confiscation’	we	see	that	there	were	essentially	six	reasons	displayed	in	table	8.	The	most	frequent	two	reasons	are:	(1)	the	person	had	too	much	debt,	and	(2)	net	value	of	wealth	was	insignificant.				
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Table	8.	
Official	Reasoning	Behind	the	Non-Confiscation	Outcomes	
Reason/Outcome	 No	Confiscation	 Inheritance	Tax	 Total	Having	too	Much	Debt	 49	 10	 59	
Appearance	of	Heirs	 3	 0	 3	
Insignificant	Sum	 40	 1	 41	Requests	by	Mediators	 6	 0	 6	
Mercy	of	the	Sultan	 33	 2	 36	
Pardoning	of	the	Pun-ished	 3	 3	 6	
Total	 134	 16	 150	
Source:	See	appendix	B	for	data	sources.	
7 Conclusion	Ottoman	rulers	have	confiscated	elite	property	throughout	centuries.	However,	enforce-ment	of	confiscations	during	the	chosen	period	was	not	smooth.	They	had	to	take	many	things	into	account	when	confiscating.	Most	importantly,	during	wartime	they	tended	not	to	confiscate	the	wealth	of	an	individual	who	was	needed	by	the	state.	They	also	abstained	from	confiscation	in	remote	areas,	preferring	locations	proximate	to	Istanbul,	where	con-fiscated	assets	were	transported.	Once	these	factors	led	to	a	decision	to	send	a	confiscator	to	the	location	of	wealth	to	prepare	an	inventory,	the	second	step	outcome	was	based	on	the	attributes	of	wealth	and	the	family’s	bargaining	power.	If	the	magnitude	of	wealth	was	bigger,	confiscation	was	a	more	likely	outcome.	Likewise,	confiscation	was	more	likely	to	happen	if	the	wealth	was	more	liquid.	A	powerful	family	had	a	higher	chance	of	turning	a	
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potential	full	confiscation	into	inheritance	tax	in	which	case	they	were	to	pay	an	amount	of	cash	to	the	public	treasury.		
This	paper	does	not	aim	to	deny	either	the	act	of	violence	or	arbitrariness	embedded	in	Ottoman	confiscations.	Rather,	it	argues	that	confiscations	were	conducted	in	light	of	the	above	constraints.	Historians	have	long	emphasized	the	problem	with	the	notion	of	‘ab-solutism.’	Economic	historians	have	drawn	attention	to	the	fiscal,	legal	and	administrative	capacity	of	states	as	an	important	element	of	long-run	economic	growth.	This	paper	con-tributes	to	this	line	of	literature	by	showing	how	low	capacity	of	a	state	where	the	ruler	was	not	constrained	by	a	formal	system	of	checks	and	balances	could,	in	turn,	determine	the	 way	 government	 confiscation	 was	 practiced.	 In	 other	 words,	 low	 state	 capacity,	caused	by	the	size	of	the	empire	and	its	persistent	dependence	on	local	elites,	decreased	its	ability	to	confiscate	too.		
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Appendix	A.	
Appendix	Table	A1.		
Relative	Risks	of	the	Outcome	of	the	Process	of	Confiscation	without	Liquidity	(Full	sam-ple)	
Source:	See	bibliography	for	data	sources.	
Notes:	***,	**,	and	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	1,	5,	and	10	per	cent	levels.	C:	Confiscation,	NC:	No	
Confiscation,	IT:	Inheritance	Tax.	The	reference	category	is	always	the	one	after	/.	If	relative	risk	is	greater	
than	1,	the	odds	of	reference	category	are	higher	compared	to	the	comparison	category.	If	it	is	lower	than	1,	
the	outcome	is	more	likely	to	fall	in	the	comparison	group.	
	
	 1	 2	
DV	categories	 NC/C	 IT/C	 IT/NC	 NC/C	 IT/NC	 IT/NC	
Wealth	 Net	value	 0.663***	 1.319***	 1.987***	 0.737**	 1.003	 1.360**	
Conflict	 Interstate	wars	 0.564	 6.087*	 10.786	 1.276	 4.933*	 3.863	Rebellion	 1.222	 1.113	 0.910	 1.303**	 1.030	 0.790	
Spatiality	 Distance	 1.164***	 1.365***	 1.172*	 1.150***	 1.377***	 1.197**	
	
	
	
	
	
Identity	
Gender	 	 	 	 	 	 				Male	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Female	 0.267*	 0.184	 0.821	 0.223**	 0.167	 0.751	Religion	 	 	 	 	 	 				Muslim	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Non-Muslim	 0.164**	 0.287*	 1.788	 0.130***	 0.269**	 2.069	Title	 	 	 	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 0.217***	 0.292***	 1.347	 0.209***	 0.389***	 1.853**		
Bargaining	
Power	
Family	 Affilia-tion	 	 	 	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 1.626	 4.115***	 2.530*	 1.232	 4.615***	 3.745***	Warzone	 0.925**	 1.029	 1.112**	 0.940**	 1.052	 1.118***	
Sultan	 Be-
haviour	
Elapsed	 0.951**	 1.005	 1.056*	 0.969*	 1.001	 1.032	
Rules	 Justification	 0.347***	 0.523***	 1.507	 0.516**	 0.559**	 1.042		 N	 775	 775	 775	 826	 826	 826		 Pseudo	R2	 0.2162	 0.2162	 0.2162	 0.1819	 0.1819	 0.1819		 LR	Chi2	 241.57	 241.57	 241.57	 203.14	 203.14	 203.14		 Prob	Chi2	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.000	
37		
Appendix	Table	A2.	
Relative	Risks	of	the	Outcome	of	the	Process	of	Confiscation	with	Liquidity	(Full	Sample)	
Source:	See	bibliography	for	data	sources.	
Notes:	***,	**,	and	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	1,	5,	and	10	per	cent	levels.	C:	Confiscation,	NC:	No	
Confiscation,	IT:	Inheritance	Tax.	The	reference	category	is	always	the	one	after	/.	If	relative	risk	is	greater	
than	1,	the	odds	of	reference	category	are	higher	compared	to	the	comparison	category.	If	it	is	lower	than	1,	
the	outcome	is	more	likely	to	fall	in	the	comparison	group.		
	
	
	
	
	
	 1	 2	
DV	categories	 NC/C	 IT/C	 IT/NC	 NC/C	 IT/NC	 NC/C	
Wealth	 Net	value	 0.553***	 1.319***	 2.385***	 0.895*	 1.010	 1.128*	
	 Liquidity	 0.968**	 0.958***	 0.989	 0.969***	 0.957***	 0.986	
Conflict	 Interstate	wars	 3.319	 23.318**	 7.024	 4.400	 33.457**	 7.603	Rebellion	 1.893**	 0.909	 0.480**	 1.796**	 0.809	 0.450***	
Spatiality	 Distance	 1.103	 1.302***	 1.180	 1.062	 1.357***	 1.277**	
	
Identity	
Title	 	 	 	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 0.302**	 0.364**	 1.201	 0.254***	 0.453**	 1.782		
Bargaining	
Power	
Family	 Affilia-tion	 	 	 	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 1.464	 4.331***	 2.957**	 0.896	 4.275***	 4.771**	Warzone	 0.952	 1.005	 1.055	 0.949	 1.042	 1.097	
Sultan	 Be-
havior	
Elapsed	 0.930*	 1.027	 1.104**	 0.957	 1.030	 1.076*	
Rules	 Justification	 0.314*	 0.462**	 1.471	 0.745	 0.450**	 0.603		 N	 344	 344	 344	 360	 360	 360		 Pseudo	R2	 0.2451	 0.2451	 0.2451	 0.2475	 0.2475	 0.2475		 LR	Chi2	 144.92	 144.92	 144.92	 128.45	 128.45	 128.45		 Prob	Chi2	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.000	
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Appendix	B:	Sources	of	Data	
Ali	Emiri	Sultan	Abdülhamid	I	304/20407	
Ali	Emiri	Sultan	Mustafa	III	26/1797,	193/15240	
Ali	Emiri	Sultan	Selim	III	5/244,	 70/4188,	 144/8720,	 174/10429,	 189/11380,	 221/12949,	 269/15545,	357/20462,	361/20660,	410/23604	
Başmuhasebe	Kalemi	Muhallefat	Halifeliği	Defterleri	5618,	12442,	12456,	12571,	12585,	12586,	12587,	12590,	12591,	12592,	12593,	12594,	12597,	12603,	12606,	12609,	12612,	12617,	12618,	12619,	12620,	12629,	12634,	12635,	12636,	12637,	12639,	12640,	12652,	12653,	12654,	12656,	12657,	12659,	12660,	12662,	12663,	12664,	12666,	12668,	12669,	12670,	12671,	12673,	12674,	12675,	12676,	12677,	12678,	12679,	12680,	12681,	12682,	12683,	12684,	12685,	12686,	12690,	12691,	12694,	12695,	12696,	12697,	12698,	12699,	12701,	12702,	12703,	12704,	12705,	12706,	12708,	12710,	12711,	12712,	12713,	12714,	12717,	12719,	12720,	12721,	12722,	12723,	12725,	12726,	12727,	12728,	12730,	12731,	12732,	12733,	12734,	12735,	12736,	12739,	12746,	12748,	12749,	12750,	12752,	12754,	12756,	12757,	12758,	12759,	12761,	12763,	12766,	12769,	12771,	12772,	12774,	12775,	12777,	12778,	12779,	12781,	12782,	12784,	12785,	12786,	12788,	12789,	12790,	12793,	12794,	12796,	12797,	12799,	12800,	12801,	12802,	12803,	12805,	12806,	12807,	12808,	12809,	12810,	12812,	12813,	12814,	12815,	12816,	12817,	12818,	12819,	12822,	12823,	12826,	12828,	12829,	12830,	12831,	12832,	12836,	12837,	12838,	12839,	12840,	12841,	12842,	12843,	12844,	12846,	12847,		12848,	12849,	12852,	12853,	12854,	12855,	12856,	12858,	12859,	12860,	12861,	12862,	12863,	12864,	12865,	12866,	12867,	12868,	12869,	12870,	12872,	12873,	12876,	12878,	12882,	12883,	12884,	12885,	12886,	12887,	12888,	12889,	12890,	12892,	12894,	12895,	12896,	12898,	12899,	12900,	12901,	12902,	12906,		12907,	12908,	12909,	12910,	12912,	12913,	12914,	12915,	12917,	12918,	12919,	12920,	12921,	12922,	12923,	12924,	12925,	12926,	12928,	12929,	12930,	12931,	12932,	12934,	12936,	12937,	12938,	12939,	12940,	12941,	12942,	12943,	12945,	12946,	12948,	12949,	12950,	12952,	12955,	12956,	12957,	12958,	12960,	12961,	12962,	12963,	12964,	12966,	12967,	12968,	12969,	12970,	12972,	12975,	12979,	12980,	12981,	12982,	12983,	12984,	12985,	12986,	12988,	12989,	12990,	12992,	12993,	12995,	12996,	12997,	12998,	12999,	13001,	13002,	13003,	13004,	13005,	13006,	13007,	13008,	13009,	13010,	13011,	13012,	13013,	13014,	13015,	13016,	13017,	13018,	13020,	13022,	13023,	13024,	13025,	13027,	13028,	13029,	13030,	13031,	13034,	13035,	13036,	13037,	13038,	13039,	13040,	13044,	13046,	13047,	13048,	13049,	13050,	13051,	13052,	13053,	13055,	13056,	13057,	13059,	13060,	13061,	13062,	13063,	13064,	13068,	13069,	13070,	13071,	13072,	13074,	13075,	13076,	13077,	13079,	13081,	13082,	13084,	13085,	13086,	13087,	13088,	13089,	13090,	13091,	13092,	13093,	13094,	13095,	13097,	13098,	13099,	13100,	13101,	13102,	13103,	13107,	13110,	13111,	13112,	13114,	13115,	13116,	13117,	13119,	13120,	13121,	13122,	13123,	13125,	13126,	13129,	13130,	13131,	13132,	13133,	13134,	13135,	13136,	13137,	13140,	13141,	13142,	13143,	13144,	13145,	13151,	13152,	13153,	13155,	13156,	13158,	13159,	13160,	13161,	13162,	13163,	13164,	13165,	
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13166,	13167,	13168,	13170,	13171,	13172,	13173,	13174,	13175,	13176,	13177,	13179,	13180,	13181,	13182,	13183,	13185,	13186,	13187,	13188,	13190,	13191,	13192,	13193,	13194,	13195,	13196,	13197,	13198,	13199,	13200,	13202,	13203,	13204,	13205,	13206,	13207,	13208,	13209,	13210,	13211,	13215,	13216,	13217,	13218,	13220,	13221,	13222,	13223,	13224,	13225,	13226,	13227,	13228	,13229,	13231,	13232,	13234,	13235,	13236,	13237,	13238,	13239,	13240,	13241,	13244,	13246,	13247,	13248,	13251,	13252,	13253,	13254,	13255,	13256,	13257,	13258,	13259,	13260,	13261,	13262,	13263,	13264,	13265,	13267,	13268,	13269,	13271,	13273,	13275,	13277,	13278,	13279,	13281,	13282,	13283,	13284,	13285,	13286,	13289,	13290,	13291,	13292,	13293,	13294,	13295,	13296,	13297,	13298,	13299,	13300,	13301,	13302,	13303,	13304,	13305,	13306,	13307,	13308,	13309,	13310,	13311,	13312,	13313,	13314,	13317,	13318,	13319,	13320,	13321,	13323,	13324	,13325,	13326,	13327,	13329,	13330,	13331,	13332,	13336,	13337,	13339,	13340,	13341,	13342,	13343,	13345,	13347,	13348,	13349,	13350,	13351,	13359,	13360,	13361,	13362,	13363,	13365,	13366,	13367,	13368,	13369,	13370,	13371,	13372,	13373,	13374,	13375,	13379,	13380	,13381,	13382,	13383,	13384,	13385,	13386,	13387,	13389,	13390,	13392,	13393,	13395,	13398,	13399,	13403,	13405,	13412,	13423,	13429,	13432,	13436,	13437,	13440,	13443,	13444,	13445,	13446,	13448,	13451,	13452,	13454,	13455,	13463,	13464,	13465,	13466,	13467,	13469,	13470,	13472,	13473,	13474,	13476,	13477,	13490,	13492,	13493,	13496,	13497,	13500,	13511,	13512,	13515,	13518,	13525,	13526,	13527,	13528,	13529,	13530,	13532,	13533,	13536,	13537,	13538,	13540,	13541,	13543,	13544,	13545,	13546,	13547,	13548,	13552,	13553,	13555,	13557,	13561,	13562,	13563,	13564,	13565,	13566,	13569,	13572,	13575,	13576,	13577,	13579,	13580,	13582,	13583,	13586,	13587,	13594,	13599,	13601,	13604,	13605,	13607	,13608	,13610,	13611,	13612,	13613,	13614	,13616	,13617	,13619	,13620,	13621,	13622,	13623,	13626,	13627,	13628,	13629,	13631,	13633,	13634,	13635,	13636,	13637,	13639,	13664,	13665,	13666,	13667,	13668,	13669,	13670,	13671,	13672	,13673,	13674,	13675,	13676,	13677,	13678,	13680,	13681	,13682,	13683,	13684,	13685,	13686,	13687,	13688,	13689,	13690,	13692,	13694,	13695,	13696,	13697,	13701,	13702,	13703,	13704,	13708,	13710,	13711,	13712,	13713,	13714,	13715,	13716,	13717,	13718,	13719,	13720,	13721	,13722	,13723	,13724,	13725	,13726,	41354	
Başmuhasebe	Kalemi	Zimmet	Halifeliği	13937	
Büyük	Ruznamçe	Kalemi	Sergi	Halifeliği	21300,	21303	
Cevdet	Adliye	9/566,	 61/3687,	 84/5073,	 101/6095,	 104/6253,	 105/6277,	 25/1512,	 45/2751,	54/3288,	55/3327,	60/3628,	61/3673,	62/3729,	62/3730,	63/3754,	93/5603,	93/5604,	95/5687,	703/28713	
Cevdet	Askeriye	1041/45716	
Cevdet	Dahiliye	2/83,	 142/7090,	 156/7795,	 159/7901,	 175/8713,	 177/8815,	 182/9098,	 188/9381,	217/10808	
Cevdet	Maliye	
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42/1942,	 69/4129,	 70/3229,	 82/4979,	 95/4268,	 95/4269,	 95/4270,	 105/4660,	144/6093,	 167/7001,	 189/7845,	 227/9489,	 243/10117,	 243/10130,	 255/10503,	269/11038,	317/13048,	326/13431,	336/13768,	336/13774,	339/13926,	357/14626,	358/14690,	369/15158,	373/15355,	374/15389,	375/15406,	376/15449,	389/15918,	395/16165,	427/17283,	428/17301,	445/17993,	448/18138,	451/18257,	481/19623,	481/19624,	489/19929,	492/20005,	504/20468,	504/20496,	505/20550,	558/22906,	576/23646,	578/23731,	583/23998,	613/25271,	624/25689,	650/26610,	662/27099,	703/28713,	714/29165,	719/29421,	735/30007,	748/30460,	749/30520,	759/30930,	30930,	 762/31051,	 769/31398,	 774/31578,	 776/31697,	 777/31744,	 780/31846,	784/31951	
Darphane-i	Amire	692/1245,	9/427,	693,	1246	
Hattı	Humayunlar	105/4117C	
Kamil	Kepeci	Defterleri	2397,	2448,	2450,	2451,	2452,	2455,	2456,	2459,	2460,	2462,	2463,	3294,	3295,	3296,	3297,	753		
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Footnotes	
1	The	roots	of	this	view	can	be	traced	back	to	early	modern	intellectuals	such	as	(Machiavelli	2007),	(Smith	1937),	(Bodin	1955).		2	Halil	İnalcık	writes	that	“although	Islamic	law	strictly	forbids	confiscation	of	private	property	from	either	Muslims	or	non-Muslims,	the	property	of	the	tax-farmer	or	any	government-related	fortunes	were	always	suspect	as	to	their	origin	and	were	therefore	subject	to	confiscation.”	Yet	the	breakdown	of	the	traditional	fiscal-military	system	in	the	eighteenth	century	significantly	made	the	practice	of	confiscation	more	selec-tive	than	before.	Thus,	we	cannot	consider,	at	least	in	the	eighteenth-century	context,	what	İnalcık	claims	as	a	rule	applicable	to	all	periods	of	Ottoman	history.		3	New	Economic	Geography	suggests	that	economic	activity	is	inherently	unevenly	distributed	in	terms	of	space	(Mackinnon	and	Cumbers	2007:	27).	The	same	logic	can	be	applied	to	the	spatial	use	of	sovereign	power.	For	this,	see:	(Allen	1997:	65-69)	4	Working	with	Ottoman	titles	is	somewhat	tricky.	For	example,	it	could	well	be	that	someone	was	men-tioned	with	more	than	one	title	in	different	sources.	When	it	comes	to	social	class,	I	mean	the	one	identified	in	Ottoman	political	terminology,	primarily	the	well-known	dichotomy	between	askeri	and	reaya	(military-administrative	and	ordinary	subjects).	For	more	on	the	interpretation	of	Ottoman	titles,	see:	(Coşgel	and	Ergene	2015:	182)		5	Property	rights	of	merchants	were	generally	well-respected.	This	is	evident,	for	example,	in	a	story	nar-rated	by	the	chronicler	Naima.	Here	Derviş	Mehmed	Paşa,	the	governor	of	Basra	reports	the	misbehavior	of	a	certain	Murtaza	Paşa	who	was	allegedly	confiscating	the	wealth	of	merchants	in	this	port	city:	“Our	maj-esty!	That	castle	at	the	shore	is	under	the	protection	of	the	sultan.	For	many	years	the	commodities	of	the	merchants	are	kept	there	safely,	and	no	one	attacks	this	castle.	The	wellbeing	of	Basra	and	other	port	cities	depends	on	 the	merchants,	and	confiscation	of	 these	commodities	will	 result	 in	 the	ruin	of	 the	country.	Merchants	are	the	immaterial	treasure	of	the	sultans.	Persecuting	merchants	and	confiscating	their	money	and	commodities	can	be	observed	neither	in	Islamic	countries,	nor	in	others.	Be	generous	and	surrender	this	ambition	(Naima	1968).”	6	 Choice	models	 are	widely	 used	 in	migration	 economics.	 In	 these,	 various	 choices	 of	migrants	 such	 as	whether	to	migrate,	where	to	migrate,	or	which	occupation	to	choose	are	estimated	by	choice	models,	either	binary	or	nominal.	The	use	of	multinomial	regression	is	not	popular	either	in	economics	or	economic	his-tory.	For	one	of	the	exceptions,	see:	(Dribe,	Olsson,	and	Svensson	2012)	7	The	baseline	data	on	war	pressure	has	been	gathered	from	Şevket	Pamuk.	I	have	adjusted	it	according	to	the	needs	of	this	study	by	employing	their	main	source:	(Clodfelter	2008).	Formula	used	in	(Pamuk	and	Karaman	2013)	can	be	found	in	the	appendix	of	their	paper.	It	suffices	to	say	here	that	the	variable	is	based	on	the	number	of	casualties,	including	captives	and	missing	soldiers	and	leaving	off	deaths	among	civilians.		8	Ports	considered	as	major	ports	are:	Thessaloniki,	İzmir,	Antalya,	Mersin,	Beirut,	Samsun	and	Trabzon.	Istanbul	was	excluded	for	it	 is	 irrelevant	for	our	purposes.	The	names	of	major	ports	have	been	derived	from:	(Balzac	1992).		9	The	data	on	warzones	comes	from:	(Clodfelter	2008).																	
																																																								
